A buyer can learn her value for a returnable experience good by trying it out, with the option of returning the good for whatever refund the seller o¤ers. Sellers tend to o¤er a "no questions asked" refund for such returns, a money back guarantee.
Introduction
Many products are returned to the seller soon after their purchase. This is especially true in the United States, where about six percent of all purchased products are returned for an annual total of more than one trillion dollars. 1 Return levels are especially high in internet and catalog retailing. 2 The refunds generating these returns are generous. Full "money back"refunds of the original purchase price, sometimes lowered by a small "restocking fee" that is charged the consumer, are typical. Sellers lose money on returns; the refund they pay for a return almost always exceeds their salvage value for it. 3 Retailers have been estimated to lose up to twenty-…ve percent of their sales on returns. 4 The presence of such generous refunds suggests that return levels are ine¢ ciently high. Why do …rms o¤er refunds for returned goods that exceed their own salvage values for them?
This excess refund puzzle has little to do with the refunds speci…ed by warranties against product failure. Many returned products are not defective, are not claimed to be defective, and can not be easily veri…ed to be defective in any case. Instead, many are returned by consumers who learn soon after purchasing that they do not value the product more than the refund given for a return. 5 Clothing is returned because it is found not to …t or ‡atter; nuts and bolts are returned because they are found to be wrong for the job at hand; a silver-colored DVD player is returned because a spouse …nds it ugly. This observation suggests that the excess refund puzzle should be examined within a model in which consumers learn about a product by purchasing it.
A basic learning-by-purchasing model consists of …rms selling a good to consumers choose it. A …rm may or may not want to encourage the prior information acquisition.
It may also want to o¤er a menu of contracts from which the informed and uninformed will make di¤erent choices.
In order to disentangle the information acquisition and screening e¤ects, we restrict attention to two polar versions of the model. In Model IA (Information Acquisition), all consumers have the same, intermediate cost of becoming informed. They all thus make the same information acquisition decision. This removes the screening role of a refund, allowing us to focus on the use of refunds for dissuading consumers from acquiring prior information.
We take the opposite tack in Model SC (Screening) . In this version of the model, some consumers have a negligible or even negative cost of acquiring prior information, and so always become informed. The remaining consumers …nd it impossible to become informed prior to purchasing. This removes the information acquisition decision from the model, allowing us to focus on the role of refunds for screening the uninformed from the informed consumer types.
The addition of the prior research option does not change some of the results of the basic learning-by-purchasing model. In particular, in both versions of the model we …nd that e¢ ciency still requires refunds to equal the seller's salvage value for a return. Since we also …nd that competitive equilibria are still e¢ cient, competitive refunds are still not excessive. 8 Excessive refunds do arise, however, if the good is sold by a monopoly. It may be a monopoly retailer or, under an alternative interpretation, a monopoly wholesaler or manufacturer selling to a competitive retail sector.
We can now give a preview of the main results for a monopoly seller, in each version of the model.
Model IA
The seller in Model IA may or may not want to choose a refund contract that induces the consumers to stay uninformed, depending on which of two opposing forces prevails.
The seller bene…ts when they stay uninformed because they then receive no information rents, and the cost of acquiring prior information is not incurred. On the other hand, when the consumers become informed, the seller bene…ts by not incurring the net cost 8 Thus, we do not …nd that excessive refunds are due to competitive pressure, contrary to views expressed in the retailing literature. E.g., Bayles (2000) writes, "Reverse Logistics as a Competitive Weapon: Returns started spinning out of control back in the late 1980s, when many retailers began using returns as a competitive weapon in the battle to win market share." of producing those units of the good that would have been returned if the consumers had remained uninformed. The former force is stronger if the consumers'cost of prior information acquisition lies in an intermediate range. The …rm then o¤ers an excessive refund in order to deter them from becoming informed. A full refund of the purchase price is optimal in some cases.
Model SC
The seller in this version of the model o¤ers, in principle, a menu containing a refund and a no-refund contract. The informed consumers choose the no-refund contract, and the uninformed choose the refund contract. In order to deter the informed consumers from choosing the refund contract, it must specify a purchase price greater than that of the no-refund contract. When this incentive constraint binds, both contracts specify the same purchase price, which is equivalent to the seller o¤ering the same contract to all consumers. (The informed just ignore its refund provision.) In order for the refund contract to specify a purchase price as high as that of the no-refund contract without deterring the uninformed from purchasing, the refund must sometimes exceed the seller's salvage value for a return. Excessive refunds thus arise when the incentive constraint of the informed and the participation constraint of the uninformed both bind.
Again, even a full refund of the purchase price is optimal in some cases. Davis et al. (1995) and Che (1996) present early learning-by-purchasing models. Davis et al. (1995) assume consumers are risk neutral, and show that a monopoly prefers to o¤er a full money-back refund, rather than no refund at all, if it has a high salvage value for a return. Che (1996) assumes consumers are risk averse, and shows that a monopoly also prefers to o¤er a full refund rather than no refund if the consumers are risk averse enough. These papers do not consider partial refunds, and so do not address the excess refund puzzle. It seems clear that excessive refunds would be generated if partial refunds were to be allowed in Che (1996) , yielding an explanation based on risk aversion. On the other hand, we conjecture that if partial refunds were allowed in Davis et al. (1995) , optimal refunds would be too small rather than too large. 9;10 Courty and Li (2000) present a screening model somewhat related to our Model SC.
Related Literature
It has a di¤erent purpose, namely, to shed light on when menus of contracts are actually used, such as an airline's menu of business (refundable) and economy (less-refundable) tickets. Unlike in our model, all consumers stay uninformed of their values prior to purchasing. A consumer's private type is the distribution from which her value will be drawn after purchasing. The value distribution of a "high" type is greater than that of a "low" type either in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, or in the sense of being a mean-preserving spread. The main result is that the refunds high type consumers obtain are equal to the seller's salvage value (which is the production cost of the good); the refunds the low types obtain may bear any relationship to the salvage value. If the optimal menu ever contains just one contract, the refund it speci…es is equal to the salvage value. The model thus sheds little light on the excess refund puzzle.
Turning to Model IA, it can be viewed as a contribution to the literature on mechanisms that prevent, encourage, or determine information acquisition, such as Cremer and Khalil (1992), Lewis and Sappington (1997) , Cremer et al. (1998a,b) , and Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) . It also relates to studies of how much information a seller should directly provide buyers about their personal values, such as Lewis and Sappington (1994) , Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2002) , and Eso and Szentes (2004) .
More narrowly, Model IA can be viewed as an exploration of an early suggestion made by Barzel (1982) that sellers may sometimes want to prevent buyers from acquiring information. That suggestion is also formalized recently in Barzel et al. (2004) in a model of IPO policies. An underwriter "stabilizes" an IPO by promising to agree to buy back a certain fraction of the shares from the buying investors at the IPO price. This is analogous to a stochastic contract in our framework that randomizes between a zero and a full refund. Barzel et al. (2004) show that if the underwriter wants to deter buyers from acquiring information, its optimal stabilization policy pays the full refund with positive probability. 11 9 This is because the consumers in Davis et al. (1995) bene…t from the good during the trial period.
This should create a downward force on refunds, since large refunds aggravate the moral hazard of consumers purchasing the good only to return it after use during the trial period. 1 0 Marvel and Peck (1995) study refunds in a less related context. They show that a wholesaler might o¤er a retailer a refund for units of its good left unsold; this induces the retailer to stock enough of the good when it faces uncertain demand.
1 1 See Remark 3 in the Appendix of Barzel et. al. (2004) .
The retailing literature deals with return policies under the rubric of reverse logistics (Rogers and Tibben-Lembke, 1998) . None of it to our knowledge bears on the excess refund puzzle. The study most related to Model SC seems to be Heiman et al. (2002) , which shows how menus consisting of a full-refund contract, a no-refund contract, and an unbundled money back guarantee (essentially a pure insurance contract) can be used to screen consumer types that have di¤erent value distributions, roughly as in Courty and Li (2000) . Regarding Model IA, the most relevant paper seems to be Heiman et al. (2001) , which informally compares the relative merits of pre-purchase product demonstrations to money back guarantees as ways to reduce consumer uncertainty.
Neither it nor any other study we have seen in the retailing literature considers the possibility that …rms may not want consumers to acquire information.
Structure of the Paper
The environment is described in Section 2. Models SC and IA are studied in Sections 3 and 4, respectively; Model SC is studied …rst because it provides the building blocks for Model IA. In both cases the e¢ cient, competitive, and monopoly contracts are characterized. The analysis is applied to a monopoly wholesaler, rather than a monopoly retailer, in Section 5. Concluding remarks are in Section 6. Appendices A and B contain the proofs for Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Appendix C contains the calculations for the examples.
Environment
A discrete returnable good is to be sold to a unit mass (continuum) of potential buyers.
We consider a competitive market, but devote attention to a monopolized market. We refer to a seller as a …rm and the buyers as consumers, having in mind a retailer and its customers. Under an alternative interpretation discussed in Section 5, the seller is a wholesaler or manufacturer that sells its good to a competitive retail sector, and o¤ers refunds to the retailers for the goods that the consumers return to them.
Consumers
Each consumer wants at most one unit of the good. Her value for it, v; is drawn from a distribution F that has a positive and di¤erentiable density, f; on [0; 1]; with mean v: An informed consumer knows her value for the good when she decides whether to purchase it, and an uninformed consumer does not. No consumer's value is observed by another party.
An uninformed consumer who purchases the good learns her value for it during an initial trial period. The good gives her no bene…t if she returns it at the end of the trial period. The consumer bears a return cost of t 0 if she tries the good and then returns it to the seller.
A consumer with value v who purchases the good for price p receives utility v p if she keeps it, gross of any cost she might have borne to become informed. If she instead returns the good for a refundr; her utility isr t p:
We focus on two versions of the model that di¤er in how the number of informed consumers is determined.
Model SC (Screening). In this version an exogenously given fraction 2 (0; 1) of the consumers are informed. In essence, these consumers have a negligible or even negative cost of doing prior research to become informed. The remaining 1 consumers are necessarily uninformed, and so can learn their values only by trying the good out.
Whether a consumer is informed is independent of her value.
Model IA (Information Acquisition). In this version all consumers are ex ante identical and uninformed. Once she knows the set of contracts available in the market, each consumer chooses whether to pay an information cost, c 2 (0; 1); in order to become informed ("acquire information").
An encompassing model would allow the consumers to be arbitrarily heterogeneous in their information costs. Consumers with very high or low information costs would be like those of Model SC, and consumers with intermediate information costs would be like those of Model IA. By restricting attention to Models SC and IA, we are able to isolate the two forces at work, screening and information acquisition.
Firm
The …rm's constant unit cost of procuring the good is k 2 [0; 1): This is either the cost of directly producing the good, or of obtaining it from a wholesaler.
The gross salvage value to the …rm of a returned good is denoted byŝ. We assume it is no greater than the cost of obtaining a new unit:ŝ k: This is obviously the case when a returned good is simply discarded. It is also the case when a returned good is resold, as then the salvage value is equal to the cost k that is saved when a returned rather than a new unit is used to make a sale, less the refurbishing, restocking, and storing costs that are required to resell a returned good. 12 We also assumeŝ t: the salvage value of the good is no less than the consumer's cost of trying and returning it. Most of the results would also hold ifŝ < t; but the proofs would di¤er slightly.
The (net) salvage value of the good is its salvage value less the consumer's cost of trying and returning it: s ŝ t. In terms of the net salvage value, the parameter assumptions 0 t ŝ k become Assumption 1. k s t 0 and s 0:
Contracts
The gross refund paid by the …rm for a return isr. The (net) refund the consumer receives is the gross bene…t less the cost of trying and returning, r r t: We assume the gross refund cannot be negative, which is equivalent to r t: A refund contract is a pair (p; r) consisting of the purchase price p and the net refund r:
A …rm should never o¤er a gross refund greater than the purchase price. Unlike the possibly signi…cant cost t of returning the good after trying it, a consumer's cost of returning the good immediately after purchasing it is presumably negligible. Hence, o¤ering a refund greater than the price would create a money pump in which consumers would purchase and return large numbers of the good, creating a big loss for the …rm.
We accordingly require p r; which is equivalent to p r + t:
We thus deem a contract (p; r) to be feasible if it satis…es the following condition:
A contract with a zero refund takes the form (p; t); since its gross refund isr = r +t = 0: Of course, any contract with a nonpositive net refund will generate no returns, and hence be equivalent to a contract with a zero refund. We thus refer to any contract (p; r) with r 0 as a no-refund contract.
A full (money-back) refund contract is one withr = p, or rather, (p; r) = (p; p t):
1 2 The alternative case,ŝ > k; is less plausible, though it might hold ifŝ is the price at which the …rm can sell the good in a separate, distinct market.
Payo¤s
An uninformed consumer returns the good if and only if she learns that her value is less than the net refund o¤ered for a return. Her induced value,
is the most she would be willing to pay for the bundled good and refund option. Her expected utility from purchasing according to the terms of a contract (p; r) is V u (r) p:
The probability that an uninformed consumer returns the good is F (r): The expected pro…t of the …rm when an uninformed consumer chooses a contract (p; r) is thus
Turning to the informed consumers, note that they do not care about the refund.
An informed consumer purchases the good only if she knows she will keep it, since the refund is not more than the price. She purchases the good only if her value exceeds the price. Her gross expected utility when o¤ered price p is
Her net expected utility is V i (p) c if she paid c to learn her value. The …rm's expected pro…t from o¤ering the good for price p to an informed consumer is thus
Assumption 2. i ( ) has a unique maximizer, p I ; and 0 i (p) ? 0 as p 7 p I :
Model SC
In this section we characterize in turn the e¢ cient, competitive, and monopoly contracts in Model SC.
E¢ cient Contracts E¢ cient Contracts for the Informed
It is e¢ cient to procure the good for an informed consumer if and only if her value for it exceeds the procurement cost, i.e., v k: This outcome would be achieved if she were to be o¤ered any feasible contract of the form (p; r) = (k; r): The amount of the promised refund is irrelevant, as an informed consumer who purchases the good never returns it.
E¢ cient Contracts for the Uninformed
If an uninformed consumer obtains the good and learns her value is v; a surplus of s or v is generated depending on whether she returns the good. E¢ ciency requires the good to be returned if v < s. The resulting gross surplus is max(v; s): The expectation of this is V u (s), where V u ( ) is de…ned in (1). Hence, the maximal expected surplus generated by giving an uninformed consumer the good is
We assume it is e¢ cient to procure the good for an uninformed consumer:
If an uninformed consumer purchases the good according to the terms of a contract (p; r); the resulting outcome is e¢ cient if and only if r = s: The refund cannot be greater or less than the salvage value, for then the consumer would ine¢ ciently return or keep the good when her value is between r and s. In addition, the purchase price cannot be too high: p V u (s) is required in order for an uninformed consumer to purchase.
Among the e¢ cient contracts for an uninformed consumer that give both parties nonnegative payo¤s, (k; s) is the best for the consumer, as it gives the …rm zero pro…t.
The best for the …rm is (V u (s); s); which extracts the full surplus S u :
Achieving E¢ ciency
In equilibrium, each consumer who purchases the good chooses her most preferred contract in the market. The resulting outcome is e¢ cient if and only if the informed choose a contract with price k; and the uninformed choose a contract with refund s:
The primary example of an e¢ cient contract is (k; s): If it is the only contract o¤ered, an e¢ cient outcome is achieved . Every informed consumer purchases the good if her value is greater than k; and never returns it. Every uninformed consumer purchases the good, and returns it if she learns v < s: The …rms make zero pro…t.
E¢ ciency can also be achieved by a menu of contracts of the form f(k; r); (p; s)g;
provided the informed choose (k; r) and the uninformed choose (p; s): In general, many such incentive compatible and individually rational menus exist. But in any case, e¢ -ciency is achieved only if the uninformed choose a contract that speci…es the refund to be the salvage value. E¢ ciency precludes the paying of excessive refunds.
Competitive Contracts
As Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) proved, competition among …rms for consumers with privately known types may yield an ine¢ cient outcome. Here, whether a consumer is informed or uninformed is her privately known type. If competitive equilibria were to be ine¢ cient, perhaps competition could generate excessive refunds. However, as we now show, in our model competitive equilibria are e¢ cient.
Assuming the presence of multiple …rms, de…ne a competitive menu of contracts to be a set of refund contracts such that (a) each operating …rm o¤ers one or more of them; (b) each contract is chosen by a positive mass of consumers; (c) each …rm makes nonnegative pro…t; and (d) no …rm or entrant can o¤er a new contract that would attract consumers away from the menu and make positive pro…t.
Observe that the e¢ cient singleton menu f(k; s)g is a competitive menu. The contract (k; s) gives zero pro…t to any …rm that o¤ers it, whether it is chosen by an informed or an uninformed consumer. Its e¢ ciency implies that no other contract can both attract a consumer and yield positive pro…t.
Other menus of contracts are also competitive, such as the outcome-equivalent menu f(k; 0); (k; s)g from which the informed choose either contract. But they all achieve a zero-pro…t e¢ cient outcome:
Proposition 1. Every competitive menu of contracts achieves an e¢ cient outcome, and every contract in it earns zero pro…t. In particular, (k; s) is in the menu and chosen by all uninformed consumers.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix , and is fairly simple. At its heart is the observation that (k; s) is a surplus-maximizing contract for either type of consumer.
It also generates the same pro…t regardless of which type of consumer chooses it, as does any contract with a refund equal to the salvage value. Hence, a putative ine¢ cient equilibrium can always be destabilized by an entrant o¤ering a contract that speci…es a refund equal to the salvage value, and a price slightly higher than k. Such a contract is guaranteed to make a pro…t, no matter which types it attracts -it is impervious to the adverse selection that makes equilibria ine¢ cient in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) .
A standard undercutting argument then shows that all equilibria are e¢ cient.
Any refund paid for a return in a competitive equilibrium is thus equal to the salvage value of the good. Competitive pressure does not account for excessive refunds.
Monopoly Contracts
Assume now there is only one …rm. We consider …rst its optimal menu of contracts that induces the uninformed to purchase. Without loss of generality, we assume the menu contains two contracts, one selected by each type of consumer. We can also assume the contract meant for the informed is a no-refund contract; these consumers do not care about refunds, and giving them no refund maximally weakens the incentive constraint of the uninformed. Such a menu can be written as (p i ; p u ; r); where p i is the price speci…ed by the no-refund contract and (p u ; r) is the refund contract.
The …rm's optimal no-exclusion menu solves the following program:
Constraint (IR u ) is the individual rationality constraint insuring that the uninformed purchase. The incentive constraint (IC u ) requires an uninformed consumer to prefer (p u ; r) to the no-refund contract, which gives her utility V u (0) p i = v p i : Incentive constraint (IC i ) requires an informed consumer to prefer the no-refund contract; she does not care about the refund, and so prefers the contract with the lower price.
As the …rst step in solving (P), consider the relaxed problem obtained by removing both incentive constraints. Recall that p I maximizes i ( ); and contract (V u (s); s) maximizes u (p u ; r) subject to (IR u ): Hence, the solution to this relaxed problem, the
; the menu M F B satis…es both incentive constraints: (IC u ) holds because 0 v p I ; and (IC i ) holds because V u (s) p I : Furthermore, the …rm cannot gain by excluding the uninformed in this case, as it would lose the pro…t S u from each of them without being able to extract more from the informed. The menu M F B is therefore the …rm's optimal menu in this case.
When instead p I < v; the …rst-best menu violates the uninformed's incentive constraint (IC u ); since the no-refund contract with price p I gives the uninformed positive utility. The constraint is optimally restored by making the no-refund contract less attractive by raising p i above p I ; and by making the refund contract more attractive by
The refund remains equal to the salvage value. This is because raising the refund is an ine¢ cient way to give the uninformed rent. The …rm's pro…t on an uninformed consumer is the surplus generated by the transaction less the rent she must be given to satisfy her incentive constraint, and hence is maximized by setting the refund equal to the salvage value to maximize the surplus, and lowering the non-distortionary price p u to give the consumer the required rent.
We have thus obtained the …rm's optimal scheme when p I V u (s): The following proposition, proved in the Appendix , summarizes.
Proposition 2. If p I V u (s); the …rm does not exclude the uninformed, and its opti-
Excessive refunds are thus possible only when p I > V u (s): In this case the …rst-best menu violates the informed consumers'incentive constraint, (IC i ), since the price V u (s)
in the refund contract is less than the p I of the no-refund contract. As we shall prove, the constraint is optimally restored by making the no-refund contract more attractive by lowering p i below p I ; and by making the refund contract less attractive by raising
But raising p u will cause the uninformed to refrain from purchasingunless the refund is raised as well. This generates an excessive refund.
However, lowering p i causes a loss in pro…t on the informed that may outweigh the pro…t obtained from the uninformed. If so, the …rm should simply o¤er the no-refund contract with price p I that maximizes its pro…t on the informed. The uninformed then will not purchase, since p I > V u (s) implies p I > v: The …rm does not prefer this noexclusion strategy if the informed consumers are only a small fraction of the population.
The following theorem gives the details.
; then 2 (0; 1] exists such that the …rm does not exclude the uninformed if < . In this case the optimal menu satis…es p i = p u = V u (r) < p I ; and r s:
; then r > s:
In addition to showing the optimality of excessive refunds, Theorem 1 also shows that the …rm can achieve its optimal pro…t by o¤ering just one contract. Because the two contracts in the optimal no-exclusion menu specify the same purchase price, the …rm achieves the same outcome by o¤ering just one contract, (V u (r); r): This is in contrast to the case of Proposition 2, since then p i < p u except in exceptional cases. Thus, within the context of Model SC, a …rm observed to sell a good for one price without a refund and for a higher price with a promised refund, is not o¤ering an excessive refund.
But a …rm observed to always sell its product with a refund may indeed be o¤ering an excessive refund.
We note in passing that each case in Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 holds for some parameters. For example, if k > 0 and F is uniform, we have the case p I > V u (s) of Theorem 1. 13 We end this section with an example showing that a …rm in Model SC may optimally o¤er a full money-back refund, as in reality many do. 
Model IA
We now consider Model IA, studying in turn e¢ cient and monopoly contracts.
E¢ cient Contracts
For the same reasons as in Model SC, if it is e¢ cient for consumers to stay uninformed, they must be given a contract of the form (p; s); with the price p low enough that they purchase. If instead it is e¢ cient for them to become informed, they must be given a contract specifying k as the purchase price. Determining whether they should become informed requires a comparison of social bene…ts and costs.
The social bene…t of a consumer becoming informed is that the procurement cost of the good can be saved when her value turns out to be less than k; as she should then not be given the good. The social cost of her becoming informed is the information cost c; and the expected opportunity cost of the unrealized net salvage value.
Formally, the expected surplus created if the consumers become informed is On the other hand, the surplus created if they stay uninformed is S u = V u (s) k:
Whether they should become informed depends on which surplus is greater. Equating the two and solving for c yields the social value of pre-purchase information:
E¢ ciency requires the consumer to stay uninformed only if c c :
As in Model SC, e¢ ciency is achieved if (k; s) is the only contract available. To prove this, we now need only to show that this contract induces e¢ cient information acquisition. It does so because it gives a consumer all the surplus that can be generated given her information choice: she obtains utility V i (k) c = S i (c) if she becomes informed, and V u (s) k = S u if she does not. Each consumer thus acquires information e¢ ciently if o¤ered (k; s):
Other contracts also achieve e¢ ciency. If c c , any contract specifying a purchase price of k and a refund less than the salvage value achieves an e¢ cient outcome, since lowering the refund only increases the incentive to take the e¢ cient action of becoming informed. If c > c ; contracts generally exist that specify a greater price and achieve e¢ ciency. The price cannot, however, be so high as to induce the consumers to become informed or refrain from purchasing.
Despite this multiplicity, e¢ ciency requires that any refund ever paid be equal to the salvage value, and hence precludes the paying of excessive refunds.
Furthermore, competitive refunds are also not excessive, because again a competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient. In particular, if c > c the competitive equilibrium consists of all …rms o¤ering (k; s): We omit a formal statement and proof of this, as the argument is the standard one of Bertrand undercutting. Adverse selection is not an issue now, since the consumers are ex ante identical.
Monopoly Contracts
We show now that a monopoly …rm o¤ers an excessive refund if the consumers'information cost is not too low or high. The …rm raises the refund above the salvage value so that it can charge a higher price without triggering information acquisition.
Consider …rst a consumer's decision to acquire information. When o¤ered a contract (p; r), she becomes informed if V i (p) c V u (r) p: Using (1) and (3) and integrating by parts, this becomes
The expression on the right of this inequality is the consumer's value, when o¤ered the contract, for the pre-purchase information. She acquires the information only if her cost of doing so is less than her value for it. Now, recall the contract (V u (s); s) that would yield pro…t S u if the consumers were to stay uninformed. When o¤ered it, a consumer's value for information is When the information cost is less than c; the …rm must take into account the possibility that the contract it chooses to o¤er may induce information acquisition. In order to determine the …rm's optimal o¤er, we derive separately its optima within the sets of contracts that do and do not induce the consumers to become informed.
Inducing Consumers to Stay Uninformed
A contract that induces consumers to stay uninformed fails to satisfy (7). Thus, if we de…ne a price P (r; c) by 14
a consumer is content to stay uninformed if and only if the following information acquisition constraint holds:
It is easy to show that P (r; c) increases in both arguments. Hence, the greater is the refund or the information cost, the more the purchase price can be raised without 1 4 Let P (r; 0) = 0 for r < 0; as any nonpositive price satis…es (9) if r 0 and c = 0: Then P is continuous on [ t; 1) R+:
triggering information acquisition. The contract (V u (s); s) that extracts the full surplus from the uninformed fails to satisfy this constraint precisely when c < c:
The maximal pro…t obtainable while inducing the consumers stay uninformed is
(FE) 0 r + t p:
The following proposition states that if the information cost is less than c; but the …rm can still make pro…t without inducing information acquisition, 15 it does so optimally by o¤ering a contract for which the information acquisition constraint binds and the refund is excessive.
Proposition 3. If c < c and u (c) > 0; any solution (p ; r ) of (P u ) satis…es p = P (r ; c), and r > s:
We explain the rationale for the excess refund result of Proposition 3 by comparing its "low c"case to the "high c"case of Lemma 1. In the latter case, a consumer's threat of becoming informed is not credible. This allows the …rm, given any refund, to set the purchase price equal to a consumer's induced value for the good, V u (r). The …rm's marginal bene…t if it then raises the refund is the amount that doing so allows this price to be raised: 16
On the other hand, in the low c case the information constraint binds, and so the …rm sets the price equal to P (r; c) in order to deter information acquisition. The …rm's marginal bene…t from raising the refund in this case is
Note that M B L > M B H (as P (r; c) < 1) : the …rm's marginal bene…t from raising the refund is strictly greater when it must deter information acquisition. The net cost of providing the refund option is (r s)F (r) in both cases, and so raising the refund has 1 5 A solution of (Pu) that yields nonpositive pro…t is not relevant, since then the …rm optimally chooses a contract that induces consumers to become informed. See Lemma B6 in the Appendix.
1 6 The fact that V 0 u (r) = F (r) is intuitive. An increase of r in the refund increases the consumer's induced value by the increase in the expected refund payment, F (r) r: the same marginal cost in both cases. The optimal refund in the low c case is therefore greater than the optimal refund in the high c case. The latter refund is the salvage value, by Lemma 1, and so the former refund must exceed the salvage value.
Inducing Consumers to Become Informed
We now turn to the …rm's optimal contract that induces the consumers to become informed. We can restrict attention to no-refund contracts, since the informed do not return the good. The consumers then choose to become informed only if the purchase price exceeds P (0; c): This yields another information acquisition constraint,
Even if this is satis…ed, the consumers will still stay uninformed if their payo¤ from becoming informed, V i (p) c; is negative. This yields the individual rationality constraint
where P i ( ) is the inverse of V i ( ).
These two constraints are necessary and su¢ cient for the contract to induce the consumers to become informed. The optimal price solves the program
For small enough c; neither constraint binds and the optimal price is just p I : For higher c; one of the constraints binds, and so determines the solution. Which one binds depends on whether p I is greater than the mean value v; as the following proposition shows. The two alternative cases are depicted together in Figure 1 . 
If p I < v, the solution is The …rm's optimal strategy is thus to deter consumers from becoming informed precisely when c exceeds c: The optimal refund is excessive in a range of cases because c is strictly less than c : when c is between these two critical levels, the …rm induces consumers to stay uninformed by o¤ering a refund greater than the salvage value. We end this section with an example again showing that the …rm may optimally o¤er a full refund. This occurs when the transaction cost t is high enough that the feasibility constraint in (P u ) binds, so that the gross refund is equal to the purchase price. The example also shows that c may be more or less than c : This implies that the …rm may induce too little or too much information acquisition. When c < c < c ; the …rm o¤ers a refund that deters the consumers from becoming informed, whereas a benevolent social planner would not; the opposite is true when c < c < c: 
Monopoly Wholesaler
Rather than being a monopoly retailer, an alternative interpretation in either model is that the …rm is a monopoly wholesaler or manufacturer that sells to a competitive retail sector. The questions then center on the price and refund the wholesaler o¤ers retailers.
The results of both models still hold, assuming the returns of a retailer to the wholesaler are the goods returned to it by consumers. 17 This is because the competition between retailers drives their pro…ts to zero, and they hence simply pass through to consumers the price and refund set by the wholesaler. It is then as though the wholesaler deals directly with the consumers.
To be speci…c, let our …rm be a wholesaler that has cost k for producing a unit of the good, and salvage valueŝ for each return. Its decision variables are a price p and a gross refundr to o¤er retailers. Let t R be a retailer's cost of returning the good to the wholesaler, and let t continue to be the consumer's cost of trying and returning a good to a retailer. A retailer's gross salvage value for a consumer return is then the net refund it obtains from the wholesaler for the return:ŝ R =r t R : A retailer's net salvage value for a return is thus
A retailer's cost of procuring the good is the price it pays the wholesaler: k R = p:
A retailer sells the good to consumers for a price p R and a gross refundr R ; which amounts to what we have called a contract (p R ; r R ) with net refund r R =r R t: A competitive retail equilibrium in either model, as was discussed in the previous sections, consists of each retailer o¤ering the zero-pro…t contract (p R ; r R ) = (k R ; s R ): 18 Hence, in terms of the wholesaler's decision variables, the consumers face contract (p R ; r R ) = (p; r); where r =r t R t: Given the wholesaler's choice of (p; r); the consumers have exactly the same choice problem as in the previous sections. The wholesaler's pro…t from an informed consumer is i (p); as the retailers make zero pro…t, an informed consumer never returns the good, and she buys if and only her value exceeds p R = p:
Since every return to a retailer is returned to the wholesaler, the wholesaler's probability of a return from an uninformed consumer is the same as a retailer's, F (r): Thus, letting s =ŝ t R t; the wholesaler's pro…t on an uninformed consumer is p k + (ŝ r)F (r) = p k + (s r)F (r) = u (p; r):
These are the same pro…t expressions as in the previous sections, and so their results hold unchanged with the wholesaler as the …rm, except that now the cost of trying and returning is the sum t R + t:
Conclusions
We have provided a possible explanation for the prevalence of generous return policies for consumer goods. Rather than starting from the premise that consumers are risk averse, our explanation is based on the premise that at least some consumers are able to learn about their personal values for a good without trying it out. In either version of the model, a seller with market power promises a refund that is no less, and is sometimes more, than its salvage value for a return. Such refunds are excessive in so far as they generate an ine¢ ciently high number of returns.
Refunds have a screening function in Model SC. The consumers in it are of two types, those who are ex ante informed of their values, and those who are uninformed and can learn their values for the good only by trying it out. By o¤ering an excessive refund, the …rm is able to charge a higher price, and it chooses to do this if the price it would like to charge the informed consumers in isolation is su¢ ciently high. An excessive refund is promised in order to weaken the informed type's incentive constraint. This screening can occur without the use of a menu of contracts, since both types of consumer pay the same price for the good when the incentive constraint of the informed types binds.
Refunds play a di¤erent role in Model IA. Here, they serve to deter consumers from becoming informed of their values before purchasing, thereby eliminating information rents. The refund is not excessive if the consumers'cost of acquiring information is so high that it can be ignored. Otherwise the information acquisition constraint binds, which causes any refund that is ever paid to be excessive. However, a caveat to this excessive refund result is that for some parameter values, the …rm does not o¤er a refund when a benevolent social planner would (see Example 2).
Our explanations for excessive refunds also apply to the refunds a monopoly wholesaler o¤ers retailers for the returns that they receive from consumers. To the extent that wholesalers are more likely than retailers to have market power, the model may be at least as applicable to the excessive refunds o¤ered by wholesalers to retailers as it is for those o¤ered by retailers to consumers.
The hypotheses developed here await empirical study. Future work will hopefully produce the data and the empirical tests to determine the relative merits of the screening and information acquisition (and risk aversion) rationales for refunds.
Appendices
Appendices A and B contain the proofs omitted from Sections 3 and 4 for Models SC and IA, respectively. Some lemmas in Appendix A are again used in Appendix B. The calculations for each section's example are collected in Appendix C.
A. Proofs for Section 3
Given a promised refund r; the surplus generated when an uninformed consumer pur-
Lemma A1. The unique maximizer of S u (r) is s; yielding S u (s) = S u : Furthermore, S 0 u (r) ? 0 as r 7 s:
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (p;r) be a contract in a competitive menu chosen by some informed consumers. These consumers are indi¤erent between (p;r) and the no-refund contract (p; 0): For any " > 0; they would prefer the contract (p "; 0): An entrant o¤ering this contract would attract all the informed consumers and earn a pro…t of p " k on each of them, and on any uninformed consumers the contract might attract.
Since this entrant cannot earn positive pro…t, we conclude thatp k: This implies that every …rm makes nonpositive pro…t on the informed consumers. Now let (p; r) be a contract in the menu chosen by some uninformed consumers.
As the …rm o¤ering it makes nonnegative pro…t overall, and nonpositive pro…t on the informed, it must make nonnegative pro…t on (p; r) when it is chosen by an uninformed consumer: u (p; r) 0: If r 6 = s; the surplus generated when an uninformed consumer chooses (p; r) is not the maximal amount, S u = S u (s); by Lemma A1. Thus, an entrant could o¤er a contract of the form (p 0 ; s), with p 0 set so that
This new contract would attract all the uninformed, and earn positive pro…t on them. It would also earn positive pro…t if an informed consumer chose it, since its realized pro…t does not depend on whether the good is returned. This is a contradiction, since an entrant should not be able to make positive pro…t. This proves r = s: An undercutting argument like that above now proves p k: But since we have already shown u (p; r) 0 and r = s; we conclude that p = k:
Every …rm thus makes zero pro…t on the uninformed, and so must also make zero pro…t on the informed. Hence,p = k: We conclude that every contract in the menu makes zero pro…t, and an e¢ cient outcome is achieved because the informed choose contracts of the form (k;r); and the uninformed choose (k; s):
Proof of Proposition 2. We can assume p I < v; since the proof for case
is in the text. Consider the relaxed problem obtained from (P) by deleting constraints (IC i ) and (FE). This relaxed program has just two constraints, (IC u ) and (IR u ), and they can be written as one, V u (r) p u U (p i ); where
This combined constraint binds, as otherwise p u could be pro…tably raised. Using this binding combined constraint to substitute for p u in u (p u ; r); and using (A1), we can write the relaxed program as (Pa) max
A triple (p i ; p u ; r) solves the relaxed program obtained from (P) by deleting (IC i ) and (FE) if and only if (p i ; r) solves (Pa) and
By Lemma A1, the second term in (A3) is uniquely maximized by r = s. Denote the …rst term as A(p i ); and note that
Since p I < v; Assumption 2 and 0 < < 1 imply 
We now show that the relaxed program and (P) have the same solutions. This price is greater than p I ; since p I < v in the present case. Thus, lowering p to p I increases the pro…t obtained on the informed and, as a bonus, pro…tably attracts the uninformed too. Excluding the uninformed is therefore not optimal.
Lemma A2. If t > 0; then r v 2 (s; 1) exists such that V u (r v ) = r v + t and, for all r t;
If t = 0; we let r v = 1 and have V u (r) > r for r < r v ; and V u (r) = r for r r v :
Proof. Note that V 0 (r) = F (r) < 1 for all r < 1: By Assumptions 1 and 3, V u (s) > k s + t: Hence, V u (r) > r + t for r s: For r 1; V u (r) = r r + t: So
is well-de…ned and satis…es the stated properties.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is in two steps. In the …rst we characterize the optimal no-exclusion menu. In the second we show that this menu is better than the no-refund contract with price p I that excludes the uninformed if is small.
Step 1. Consider the relaxed program obtained by deleting (IC u ) from (P). In this program (IR u ) binds, as otherwise p u could be raised pro…tably. So p u = V u (r): Substitute this into the relaxed program and use (A1) to obtain (Pb) max 
Denote the objective function of (Pb 0 ) as M (r): It is a continuous function, with a right derivative on [0; 1) given by 
, and this again yields r > s:
It remains to show that a solution (p i ; p u ; r) = (V u (r); V u (r); r) of (Pb) satis…es
nondecreasing, that r > s; and hence (s r)f (r) < 0: Also, V u (r) p I and Assumption 2 imply 0 i (V u (r)) 0: Thus, in light of (A5), M 0 (r) < 0: So r must be a left corner solution of (Pb 0 ): r = t: This contradicts r > s; by Assumption 1. Hence, p u < p I :
Step 2. Write the optimal no-exclusion menu of
Step 1 as a function of ;
where r = r ( ) solves program (Pb 0 ): Lemma A1 implies r (0) = s: Denote the value function of (Pb 0 ) as
By the maximum theorem, sc ( ) is continuous on [0; 1]: De…ne
The …rm does not exclude the uninformed when X( ) > 0; since (p I ; 0) is the optimal exclusion contract. Note that
So Assumption 
B. Proofs for Section 4
Recall that Proposition 3 is about
Lemma B1. u (c) is well-de…ned and continuous at any c 0:
Proof. For any c 0; the constraint set of (P u ) is non-empty, as it contains (p; r) = and, for all r 2 [ t; 1];
Proof. First consider c 2 (0; c): Since P (s; c) = V u (s); and P (s; ) is increasing, P (s; c) < V u (s): But P (1; c) = 1 + c > 1 = V u (1): By continuity, r vp 2 (s; 1) exists such that P (r vp ; c) = V u (r vp ): For any (r;ĉ); we have the derivatives P r (r;ĉ) = F (r)=F (P (r;ĉ)) and V 0 u (r) = F (r); and hence P r (r;ĉ) V 0 u (r). Since r vp < 1; P (r vp ; c) = V u (r vp ) < 1: So P r (r vp ; c) > V 0 u (r vp ): Therefore P (r; c) > V u (r) if r > r vp ; and P (r; c) < V u (r) if r < r vp :
Now consider c = 0: Since P (r; 0) = max(r; 0); and V u (r) > r for r < 1; and V u (1) = 1; the lemma's claim holds with r vp = 1.
Lemma B3. For c t; P (r; c) r + t for all r t: For c < t; there exists r p 2 [ t; 1)
such that P (r p ; c) = r p + t and P (r; c) ? r + t () r 7 r p :
Proof. Since F ( ) 1 and c 0;
for any r: Thus, P (r; c) r + t for all r if c t: Now assume c < t: Then for r 1; P (r; c) = r + c < r + t: Since P ( t; c) 0; we have P (r; c) r + t at r = t: Since P ( ; ) is continuous, this proves the existence of r p 2 [ t; 1) such that P (r p ; c) = r p + t:
Because P ( ; c) is constant on [ t; 0]; P r (r; c) < 1 for r < 0: For r 0; P r (r; c) = F (r)=F (P (r; c)):Thus, if r 2 [0; 1) and P (r; c) = r + t; then P r (r; c) < 1 (as t > 0 since c < t): So the graph of P ( ; c) crosses that of r + t from above at r p ; and the two curves do not cross at any other r:
Lemma B4. If c < c; any solution (p ; r ) of (P u ) satis…es p = P (r ; c):
Proof. Assume p < P (r ; c): Then, as the only other upper bound on the price is (IR u ); it binds: p = V u (r ): Hence, V u (r ) < P (r ; c); and so Lemma B2 implies r > r vp > s: The …rm's pro…t is
Similarly, if the …rm were to instead choose (p; r) with p = V u (r) and r 2 [r vp ; r ); its pro…t would be S u (r); which exceeds S u (r ) by Lemma A1. This contradiction proves p = P (r ; c):
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma B4, p = P (r ; c): It remains to show r > s:
Lemma B4 also implies we can substitute P (r; c) for p in (P u ): That is, de…ning
we have u (c) = A(r ); and r solves the program max r A(r) subject to t r min(r v ; r vp ; r p );
using Lemmas A2, B2, and B3. For r 0; A(r) = P (0; c) k: For r > 0;
The …rst term on the right is positive for any r s; since then P (r; c) < P (s; c) = V u (s) < 1: The second term is nonnegative for any r s: Hence, A 0 (r) > 0 for any r 2 and so
where the second equality comes from P (r p ; c) = r p + t; and the last inequality from Assumption 1. This contradiction of u (c) > 0 proves r > s:
Proof of Proposition 4. The constraint set of (P i ) is
It is nonempty if and only if P (0; c) P i (c):
) is increasing, with P (0; 0) = 0 and, by Lemma B7, P (0; V i ( v)) = v: (This veri…es the accuracy of the curves P (c; 0) and Figure 1) . Hence, C 6 = ? if and only if c 2 [0;
has a solution if and only if this is the case. Assumption 2 implies the solution is p I if P (0; c) p I P i (c); and that otherwise it is whichever price is closer to p I ; P (0; c) or
The solution is thus the p (c) de…ned by (10) and (11).
Proof. Suppose t = k s = 0: Then, when c = 0; a consumer can be induced to stay uninformed if and only if the contract o¤ers a full refund. That is: with t = 0; (FE) is p r: Since P (r; 0) = r for all r 0; (IA u ) becomes p r: The two constraints together are p = r. By Lemma A2, r v = 1; and so (IR u ) amounts to r 1: Hence,
Thus, in this case
Hence, u (0) = i (0):
Now suppose t = 0 and k s > 0: Then, as (B3) relies only on t = 0; it still holds. Let p maximize the expression shown on the right of (B3). Thenp 6 = p I ; as 0 i (p I ) = 0 and s 6 = k imply p I does not satisfy the …rst order condition. Hence,
Therefore, since s < k;
Lastly, suppose t > 0: Then, if c = 0; no contract with a positive price induces a consumer to stay uninformed; the only contract that does so is (0; t): (If t > 0; then (FE), (IA u ); and P (r; 0) = max(r; 0) together imply (p; r) = (0; t):) Hence, 
Proof. (i) i ( ) is continuous on its domain by the maximum theorem. It is nonincreasing because the constraint set of (P i ) shrinks as c increases, since P (0; c) increases and P i (c) decreases in c:
(ii) Lemma B1 shows u ( ) is continuous, and Lemma 1 shows u (c) = S u for c c:
solve (P u i): Since P (r; c 1 ) < P (r; c 2 ) for all r; (p 1 ; r 1 ) is in the constraint set of (P u 2):
If this were an equality, (p 1 ; r 1 ) would solve both programs, and so Lemma B4 would imply p 1 = P (r 1 ; c i ) for both i = 1 and i = 2; contrary to P ( ; c 1 ) < P ( ; c 2 ): Thus, u ( ) increases on [0; c]:
(iii) Consider a contract (p; s); with price p < V u (s): The consumers will surely accept it. If they stay uninformed, this contract yields pro…t p k: If they become informed, it yields the lower pro…t i (p) = (p k)(1 F (p)): Hence,
Thus, since k < 1 and
Proof. This is a consequence of (9) and 
The …rm thus o¤ers a a refund contract if c > c; and this contract satis…es the properties stated in parts 3 and 4 of the theorem by Proposition 3 and Lemma 1. Because u ( c) > i ( c), c < c: When c 2 [0; c); (B4) implies the …rm o¤ers a no-refund contract that induces the consumers to acquire information. The price in this no-refund contract is the p i (c) of Proposition 4, which is either p I or P (0; c) because p I v: But it cannot be P (0; c); since then Lemma B8 would imply u (c) > i (c); contrary to c < c and (B4).
The …rm thus o¤ers a no-refund contract with price p I for all c < c: This proves parts 1 and 2 of the theorem, with c c:
Case 3: t > 0 or s < k; and p I > v:
The proof is the same as in the previous case, except that now, when c < c; Proposition 4 implies that the price in the no-refund contract is p I for c V i (p I ); but P i (c) So V u (s) = 0:52: That Assumptions 1 3 hold is immediate. As p I > V u (s); we are in the case of Theorem 1.
We …rst derive the optimal no-exclusion menu. Recall that we can take it to be a single contract of the form (V u (r ); r ); where r maximizes 
